Overt Live Facial Recognition Policy

1.                  Policy Overview

1.1.    Facial recognition technology (“FR”) has several potential applications within a law enforcement context. The term “overt” is used to refer to the RGP’s use of live facial recognition (“LFR”) in a manner that can be detected by those members of the public who may be affected by it, particularly using awareness raising measures outlined in section 9.3 of this Policy.

1.2.    The RGP uses LFR to assist with the prevention and detection of crime, the protection of public safety, the location of wanted and vulnerable persons as well as the discharge of its statutory law enforcement functions and for the protection of Gibraltar’s National Security.

1.3.    This Policy sets out the principles and procedures which govern the RGP’s approach to LFR use, as well as explaining at a practical level how FR physically works within a live setting. LFR in Gibraltar comprises of a network of fixed cameras with LFR functionality installed at approved locations throughout Gibraltar which operates on a continuous and permanent basis. The purpose of this Policy is to ensure that the use of LFR:

(a)    Is lawful;

(b)    Is necessary and proportionate;

(c)     Is subject to appropriate human oversight;

(d)    Respects fundamental rights and freedoms;

(e)    Complies with applicable data protection legislation as well as the Gibraltar Constitution; and

(f)      Maintains public confidence through transparency and accountability.

1.4.    Unlike temporary event-based LFR deployments, the RGP’s LFR capability operates through permanently installed infrastructure located at approved sites throughout Gibraltar and operates continuously subject to the safeguards contained in this Policy.

2.       LFR use cases

 2.1.    LFR has been installed at various key locations throughout Gibraltar, which have been carefully selected to assist the RGP to pursue its statutory and policing objectives, the RGP may for various reasons need to locate individuals, including in respect of national security and the policing of Gibraltar’s fluid border with Spain. Such individuals are referred to in this policy as “Sought Persons”. LFR is a policing tool which harnesses digital technology, and in particular live FR technology, to assist the RGP in locating Sought Persons. The use of LFR may also serve to achieve the RGP’s policing objectives by helping to deter or disrupt criminality or other conduct posing a risk to public safety.

3.       How LFR works

 3.1.    The RGP LFR system consists of a network of permanently installed fixed cameras located at approved operational locations throughout Gibraltar, but mainly in the vicinity of the land border with Spain and various junctions at Main Street. The system continuously analyses facial imagery captured within designated Zones of Recognition and compares such imagery against authorised watchlists.

3.2.    The use of the core technical operation of LFR can be summarised in the following stages as follows:

4.       ‘Where’- Date, Time and Location of LFR

4.1.    As highlighted at various junctures, the RGP has a network of permanently installed LFR cameras at various locations in Gibraltar which operate continuously on a 24/7 basis. These cameras are located at the following locations:

·         Land border with Spain;

·         Four Corners;

·         Winston Churchill Avenue;

·         Gibraltar Sir Joshua Hassan International Airport;

·         Kingsway Tunnel;

·         Casemates; and

·         Main Street.

4.2.    These locations have been specifically selected on the basis that the RGP considers there to be reasonable grounds to suspect that the Deployment Locations are one at which one or more persons on the Watchlist will attend at a time or times at which they are to be sought by means of LFR. They have also been carefully selected to ensure that the RGP maintains a level of oversight over those persons entering Gibraltar and ensure that those persons on Watchlists who may enter Gibraltar may be appropriately intercepted.

5.       ‘Who’ – Watchlist Generation and Criteria for an Image’s Inclusion on a Watchlist.

5.1.    This section covers the composition, generation and management of Watchlists to be used in LFR Deployments and is structured to address:

(a)    Safeguards relevant to all Watchlists – including safeguards which apply to all Watchlists and further safeguards which have been adopted in relation to certain protected characteristics;

(b)    Who may be added to a Watchlist- including in relation to police-originated, and non-police originated imagery.

Safeguards relevant to all Watchlists

5.2.    The criteria for the construction of the Watchlist for use with LFR has been approved by the Commissioner of Police. As LFR will be operating on a continuous basis, the RGP has created one watchlist with two distinct tiers, a Tier 1 and a Tier 2. Tier 1 being the most critical to detection and action, which will assist the RGP. The Watchlist and the images utilised have been designed to ensure that it complies with the following requirements:

Additional Safeguards

5.3.    The RGP has additionally created a best practice document, to ensure suitable controls, exist around the placing of persons with protected characteristics on the Watchlist. Any controls, mitigations and processes identified by the RGP in this document reflect the RGP’s system performance and RGP’s use case for LFR.

5.4.    The RGP has confidence in LFR System’s performance, particularly in relation to gender, age and race.

5.5.    The RGP recognises that regardless of performance considerations, it should take particular care when considering and publishing details relating to (i) age including the protection of children- particularly the very young, (ii) the disabled, and (iii) those who have and/or are undertaking a gender reassignment. This is because:

a)       There may be different privacy expectations around the use of LFR and that these can be particularly relevant in relation to these people given their potential vulnerability.

b)      The RGP recognises that those involved in criminality have the wherewithal and capability to exploit information to their advantage. This may arise if there is a published performancedifferentialthat showsa lowerperformancelevel in relation to a particular protected characteristic.

5.6.    Documenting composition: Prior to adding a person onto the Watchlist, the RGP will specifically identify and document whether the person is believed or suspected to be: 

a)       aged under 18-years old;

b)      aged under 13-years old;

c)       a person with a relevant disability;

d)      a person who has undertaken a gender reassignment and it is believed or suspected to be that the image uploaded onto the Watchlist is an image of that person taken prior to their gender reassignment.

5.7.   Safeguarding regarding composition: The following outlines further, specific safeguards that apply to the composition of the Watchlist:

Police-originated images that may be included on a Watchlist.

5.8.   Images that may be deemed appropriate for inclusion within an LFR Watchlist include custody images of individuals and/or police originated images other than custody images of people who are:

a)       wanted by the courts or the RGP for certain indictable only offences; and/or

b)      deemed to be a risk to Gibraltar’s National Security; and/or

c)       suspected of having committed, or where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual depicted is about to commit an offence or where there are reasonable grounds to suspect an individual depicted to be committing and offence; and/or

d)      missing persons deemed increased risk; and/or

e)      subject of information or intelligence that would lead to suspicions of an immediate threat to life; and/or

f)        subject of information of intelligence that would lead to suspicions of an immediate risk of serious harm- including safeguarding the welfare of vulnerable people, including children at risk of imminent abuse of otherwise harmed.

5.9.    Where police originated images other than custody images are considered for use, consideration regarding the inclusion of such images is needed. Such consideration requires a case-by-case assessment. Relevant factors in that assessment may include the purpose for which the police hold such images, any processing limitations attached to the images, the importance of including such images on a Watchlist to meet a policing objective and the proportionality of using such images on an LFR System.

Non-police originated sources of Watchlist imagery.

5.10. Where it is viable to do so without unduly impacting on the performance of the LFR System, suitable police-originated images should be preferred for inclusion on a Watchlist. However, there will be occasions, where no image is held by the RGP or the wider law enforcement community, or if one is held, its quality or currency is not optimal for facial recognition purposes. In these circumstances, consideration may be given to the inclusion of non-police originated image. For the avoidance of doubt, this policy does not provide a basis to proactively acquire images solely for use on an LFR Watchlist.

5.11. Non-police originated images are images which have not been taken by law enforcement. The expectations of privacy, and the intrusion associated with such images can vary depending on the nature of the image and to aid decision making and foreseeability, these have bene attributed to three ‘layers of intrusiveness’.

5.12.                     Any non-police originated image should only be included in a Watchlist where the necessity test to do so is made out. The RGP should consider all the circumstances pertaining to the image and in particular which layers of intrusiveness the image is attributable to and the factors at 5.11 above.

5.13.                     The type of non-police originated images that may be deemed appropriate for inclusion within the LFR Watchlist are of people:

a)       wanted by the courts or the RGP for certain indictable only offences; and/or

b)      deemed to be a risk to Gibraltar’s National Security.

c)       suspected of having committed, or where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual depicted is about to commit an offence or where there are reasonable grounds to suspect an individual depicted to be committing and offence; and/or

d)      missing persons deemed increased risk; and/or

e)      subject of information or intelligence that would lead to suspicions of an immediate threat to life; and/or

f)        subject of information of intelligence that would lead to suspicions of an immediate risk of serious harm- including safeguarding the welfare of vulnerable people, including children at risk of imminent abuse of otherwise harmed.

5.14.                     ‘Wanted by the courts or the RGP for indictable only offences’- This term includes those with outstanding arrest warrants for indictable only offences or who are otherwise required by the courts in respect of those offences. The courts have already given consideration as to the necessity to locate this category of persons and given a direction that they should be apprehended. The RGP have also considered the need to locate and apprehend such persons. Such people pose a risk to the public in general.

5.15.                       ‘Persons deemed to be a risk to national security’- This term includes those who may be wanted by Interpol and included in Interpol Notices or those linked to or convicted with Terrorism related offences.

5.16.                     ‘Missing persons deemed increased risk’- This term will be subject to the UK College of Policing definition of Medium Risk (or above)¹ that is contained in the Missing Persons APP, meaning that the risk of harm to the subject or public is assessed as likely but not serious. The harm can apply equally to the subject or any other member of the public. A decision to include a missing person on the watchlist should take into account the individual circumstances of each case, including the impact it may have on the missing person and their expectations or privacy.

5.17.                     ‘Immediate threat to life; and/or immediate risk of serious harm- including safeguarding the welfare of vulnerable people, including children at imminent risk of abuse or otherwise harmed’. This ground will reflect that inclusion in the Watchlist is necessary to locate the person in order to manage risk of serious harm or an imminent need to safeguard an individual to ensure their continued welfare. The risk of harm will be informed by intelligence case.

6.                  Proportionality

6.1.   Prior to the installation of the LFR Cameras, the RGP has considered whether the installation of the LFR cameras at their proposed locations is a proportionate means of achieving the RGP’s policing and national security objectives, in light of the impact of the rights and freedoms of members of the public.

                    6.2.    The RGP has concluded that the use of LFR at the various set locations on a continuous basis is a proportionate means of                           achieving the RGP’s policing and national security objectives, in light of the rights and freedoms of members of the public, which                         has been created by virtue of the installation of LFR.

6.3.    In particular, key regard has been had to Section 7 of the Gibraltar Constitution (Protection for Privacy of Home and other property) and the fixed locations of the LFR cameras have been carefully selected to ensure that they are not close to clinics or schools, in respect of which persons will have a higher expectation of privacy. The fixed locations of LFR have all been placed in locations where persons have a lesser expectation of privacy, including at the land border and the main entry/exit points of Main Street in Gibraltar.

6.4.    The RGP has also considered the effects of Section 14 of the Gibraltar Constitution (protection from discrimination on ground, race, etc), which protects people from discrimination in the enjoyment of one or more other human rights, even when those other human rights have not been breached. The RGP is satisfied that the Deployment of LFR is proportionate as against the risk that LFR may have a particular impact on one group in society, for example because of characteristics relating to their sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property or birth.

¹The RGP applies and follows UK practice as set down by the UK College of Policing.

6.6.    The location of all LFR cameras has all been selected in locations which in the RGP’s opinion, strike a fair balance between any interference with the rights and freedoms of those affected by the installation of LFR and the achievement of the relevant policing objectives. The RGP has had due thought and regard to the following circumstances:

(a)    The degree to which the Deployment of LFR will enable policing and national security objectives to be achieved.

(b)    The degree to which the Deployment of LFR supports fundamental rights and freedoms.

(c)     The degree to which non-LFR alternatives could have been used.

(d)    The degree to which the Deployment would interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms.

7.       Management of Risk, Resource Levels and dealing with Alerts.

                   7.1.    In Deploying LFR, the RGP has considered the anticipated risk to officers and the public as against the overall intelligence                               picture, relevant factors linked to persons included on the Watchlist (e.g. seriousness of offences and warning markers linked to the                       use of violence, carriage of weapons, and propensity to escape, etc), the physical environment surrounding the locations where LFR                       has been installed and operates, the continuous duration, the need to protect Gibraltar’s community, and the reality of a free-flowing                     border with Spain.

7.2.    The RGP will ensure that there is a sufficient number of appropriately trained RGP officers to respond to Alerts. This is important to ensure that the LFR system, and the data processed by it, is being properly and effectively used. To assist, the RGP will also operate a two-tiered Watchlist, Tier 1 being the most critical to detect and action.

        7.3.    Response to an Alert- As the LFR cameras will permanently be installed in several locations across Gibraltar, it will not be possible for RGP Officers to be within the Zone of Recognition on a permanent basis. Accordingly, following the generation of an Alert, RGP Officers at the control room will undertake an Adjudication as to whether to initiate a Grade 1response, having regard to the likelihood of Subject, System or Environmental Factors influencing the generation of an Alert. The decision to respond to an Alert will not be an automatic process. Subject to an Adjudication process and an assessment of risk, the general expectation is that

the Alert will trigger a Grade 1 response and RGP Officers will then respond to the Alert with a view to detaining the individual in question.

7.4.   Whilst RGP Officers must exercise their own discretion when using their powers of arrest and detention, RGP policy is that an LFR system-generated Alert on its own, indicating that a person is on the Watchlist, should not be taken as providing sufficient grounds by itself for arrest, search or detention. Officers should seek to make sufficient additional enquiries to satisfy themselves of their grounds to arrest, search or detain. Where confronted with a non-complaint subject, and the circumstances are such that an officer has an honestly held belief that they must use their powers of arrest/detention before further checks have been possible, and this results in the use of those powers, then further checks (as necessary) should be made as soon as is reasonably practicable, so that the decision to arrest/detain is reviewed without unnecessary delay.

7.5.    If an Engaged Individual cannot be identified or fails to confirm their identity, this alone does not constitute a criminal offence and does not necessarily render them liable to arrest. Officers must be in a position to justify the use of any powers, any action taken, and have a lawful basis for doing so.

7.6.    All RGP officers and staff tasked with the operation and management of the LFR systems will receive LFR training.

8.       Governance and oversight

                    8.1.    Governance and operational oversight of the use of the technology is routinely carried out. In view of the permanent and                               continuous operation of LFR, relevant reviews will initially be carried out after the first 9 months of operations and yearly after that.

8.2.    The continuous review of the LFR Deployment is such to permit and ensure that the use of LFR remains an effective and proportionate policing tool.

                    8.3.    The retention of the CCTV footage for up to 31 days provides a means by which Alerts can be retrospectively reviewed by                            technical analysts to inform the future operation of the LFR System.

9.       Data Retention, Data Management & Transparency

                               9.1.    The RGP must ensure that the processing of any data associated with LFR is conducted in a lawful way and in                                            compliance with the RGP LFR documentation. This means that a person’s biometric data will be deleted within 72 hours,                                       irrespective as to whether they generate an Alert or otherwise.

a)       In accordance with the Data Protection Act 2004 and the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 2011 and/or

b)      In accordance with the RGP’s complaints/conduct investigation policies.

c)       To support compliance the LFR application has a full audit capability, and the RGP officer log is retained in line with standard retention periods.

d)      in accordance with an approved programme of testing in order to provide for the continued evaluation of the LFR system using operationally realistic data, any requirement to retain the CCTV footage for longer than 31 days will be subject to an approved DPIA for such testing and arrangements to ensure data subjects are informed as to the arrangements that will apply to the use and retention of such data.

           9.3.   The public will be aware of the existence of LFR through the relevant signage which has been implemented and                       installed within all Facial Recognition Zones.

10.   Contact Information

                          10.1.  The RGP LFR team can be contacted using the following email address: dpo@royalgib.police.gi

ANNEX A: Terms and Definitions

1.       Terminology

1.1.    Within the RPG and throughout the RGP’s LFR Documents, the following terms and definitions apply in relation to Live Facial Recognition